

Currently released so far... 960 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Browse by tag
CH
CE
CA
CACM
CDB
CLINTON
CU
CASC
CJAN
CM
CO
CIA
CVIS
CMGT
COUNTER
COUNTERTERRORISM
CI
CS
CG
CF
CD
CV
CY
ENRG
ETTC
ECON
EINDETRD
EPET
ETRD
EINV
EG
EUN
ELAB
EU
EAID
EFIN
ECPS
EAIR
EAGR
EIND
EN
ELTN
EWWT
EMIN
EZ
ENVR
ECIP
ET
EFIS
EXTERNAL
EI
ELECTIONS
EREL
ECUN
EINVEFIN
KNNP
KIPR
KDEM
KWBG
KN
KPAL
KGIC
KRAD
KJUS
KISL
KPWR
KGHG
KFIN
KTFN
KCRM
KHLS
KSUM
KPIN
KS
KSCA
KAWK
KPAO
KTIP
KCOM
KTIA
KBIO
KWMN
KCOR
KZ
KDRG
KAWC
KIRF
KACT
KFRD
KR
KU
KMDR
KSEC
KOLY
KE
KPKO
KSPR
KGCC
KPRP
KG
KUNR
KCIP
KHIV
KDEMAF
PGOV
PHUM
PREL
PINR
PARM
PK
PTER
PBTS
PREF
PL
PAK
PINS
PE
PROP
POL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PO
PSI
PA
PINT
PGOF
PHSA
PSOE
POLITICS
PBIO
PECON
PEPR
PM
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10BERLIN180, CHANCELLOR MERKEL ANGERED BY LACK OF GERMAN MEP
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10BERLIN180.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10BERLIN180 | 2010-02-12 17:05 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin |
VZCZCXRO2876
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0180/01 0431709
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121709Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6546
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
ID: 248711
ORIGIN: 10BERLIN180
DATE: 2010-02-12 17:09:00
SOURCE: Embassy Berlin
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
MISC: 10BERLIN128|10BERLIN176
DESTINATION: VZCZCXRO2876RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSRRUEHRL #0180/01 0431709CCCCC ZZH121709Z FEB 10AMEMBASSY BERLINRUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6546RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000180
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR, L, S/CT, EEB, INL
TREASURY FOR TFI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS: PTER KTFN PGOV PREL PINR ETTC EAIR EFIN KCRM
KJUS, KHLS, GM
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR MERKEL ANGERED BY LACK OF GERMAN MEP
SUPPORT FOR TFTP
REF: A. BERLIN 176
¶B. BERLIN 128
Classified By: ROBERT A. POLLARD, Minister-Counselor for Economics Affa
irs, for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Chancellor Merkel is privately angry over the
lack of support German members of the European Parliament
gave the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) interim
agreement and is worried that Washington will view the EP's
veto as a sign that Europe does not take the terrorist threat
seriously. Merkel is particularly irritated with German MEPs
from her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and sister
Christian Social Union (CSU) parties, most of whom reportedly
voted against the agreement despite previously indicating
they would support it. Public German reactions to the EP
vote have come exclusively from TFTP detractors who portrayed
the veto as a sign that the European Parliament has won a
victory over an arrogant Commission/Council, as well as
delivering a rebuke to U.S. counterterrorism policies that
undervalue data privacy. These events suggest the need to
intensify our engagement with German government
interlocutors, Bundestag and European parliamentarians, and
opinion makers to demonstrate that the U.S. has strong data
privacy measures in place. END SUMMARY
¶2. (C) Hamburg Mayor Ole von Beust (CDU) told Ambassador
today (2/12) that he had met with Chancellor Merkel last
night and she was "very, very angry - angrier than he had
ever seen her" with the outcome of the vote. Beust said that
the Chancellor had personally lobbied German MEPs from the
CDU/CSU parties to support the agreement, but that most of
these MEPs ended up voting against the agreement anyway.
Merkel expressed concerns to Beust that Washington will view
the EP veto as a sign that Europe does not take the terrorist
threat seriously. Merkel also worried about the
ramifications (presumably within Europe and for transatlantic
relations) that might follow were a terrorist attack to occur
that could have been prevented had SWIFT data been exchanged.
¶3. (C) Federal Justice Minister Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger,
a strong proponent of data privacy rights from the Free
Democratic Party (FDP; see reftels), quickly welcomed the
TFTP veto. She said "the citizens of Europe have won a
victory today that strengthened not just data protection, but
democracy in all of Europe." The Minister has been a vocal
critic of the TFTP and in interviews today stressed that the
EP veto will lead to a change of European policy in which
"data protection is no longer just an appendix of security
policy." She also restated her understanding that German
investigators believe TFTP data has not/not contributed
meaningfully to terrorism investigations. She said the EP
decision paves the way for new negotiations that take into
account European notions of data protection.
¶4. (C) Some German members of the European Parliament
likewise applauded the TFTP veto. Green Party MEP Jan
Philipp Albrecht stated that the vote would not cause a
"transatlantic ice-age" because President Obama has more
important concerns and would not "emphasize this defeat too
much at home." Werner Langen, head of the EP CDU/CSU group,
said that his group did not vote against the United States,
but rather against the European Commission and the Council
who had "negotiated a bad agreement." Martin Schulz, head of
the Social Democratic faction, said that the "negotiating
position of the EU is now better." FDP MEP Alexander Graf
Lambsdorff acknowledged that the decision could be a
temporary irritation in transatlantic relations, but believed
that this would not last long and the time would soon come to
"negotiate a reasonable agreement." Bavarian State Minister
Mueller told Munich CG that the CSU is interested in moving
forward with the negotiation of a new agreement that meets US
and European needs.
¶5. (C) COMMENT: Why did so many German MEPs oppose TFTP?
BERLIN 00000180 002 OF 002
First, the debate was not just about TFTP. Germans across
the political spectrum adamantly support data protection )
whether it has to do with Passenger Name Records, Google,s
supposed &monopoly8 on data searches, or individual credit
ratings. Recent scandals in which major firms such as
Deutsche Telekom and Deutsche Bahn illegally tapped phones or
files of tens of thousands of employees and customers
reinforced Germans, concerns about the misuse of data
technology. Historical memory also plays a part, as stories
about how the Stasi abused information to destroy people,s
lives still regularly circulate in the press. Paranoia runs
deep especially about U.S. intelligence agencies. We were
astonished to learn how quickly rumors about alleged U.S.
economic espionage ) at first associated with the new U.S.
air passenger registration system (ESTA), then with TFTP )
gained currency among German parliamentarians in the run-up
to the February 11 vote in Strasbourg. Moreover, the fact
that the libertarian Free Democratic Party (FDP) made data
privacy a central plank of the pact with its coalition
partners, the CDU/CSU ) and more importantly, captured the
Justice Ministry ) made it very difficult for TFTP advocates
like Interior Minister de Maiziere to speak up. None of this
may excuse the behavior of certain German MEPs, but it says
something about the challenge ahead.
¶6. (C) COMMENT CONT.: The overwhelming rejection of the
interim agreement by German MEPs from all political parties
nonetheless is surprising. Although we anticipated that the
FDP and Greens would come out strongly against the interim
agreement, the broad lack of support it received from the
CDU/CSU and Social Democrats was unexpected. We believe a
number of factors contributed to this including the fact that
MEPs of all stripes saw this as an early opportunity to exert
their new post-Lisbon powers and send a message to the
Commission and Council. Specific to Germany, the almost
complete absence of public statements by German leadership in
support of the agreement resulted in a situation in which
MEPs received no political coverage supporting a positive
vote and saw little political cost for a no vote.
Furthermore, the German public and political class largely
tends to view terrorism abstractly given that it has been
decades since any successful terrorist attack has occurred on
German soil. This week's TFTP vote demonstrates that we need
to intensify our engagement with German government
interlocutors, Bundestag and European parliamentarians and
opinion makers to get our views across. We need to also
demonstrate that the U.S. has strong data privacy measures in
place so that robust data sharing comes with robust data
protections.
Murphy