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Viewing cable 10BERLIN157, DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10BERLIN157 | 2010-02-04 16:04 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin |
VZCZCXRO6323
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0157/01 0351607
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041607Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6478
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000157
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE
WITH FM WESTERWELLE ON TROOP INCREASE FOR AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. BERLIN 138
¶B. BERLIN 112
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Defense Minister zu Guttenberg revealed in
a February 3 meeting with Ambassador Murphy that coalition
partner FM Westerwelle -- not the opposition Social
Democratic Party (SPD) -- had been the single biggest
obstacle
to the government seeking a bigger increase in German
troops for Afghanistan. But even with the modest planned
troop increase of 500 (with 350 more in reserve), zu
Guttenberg said a restructuring of the current Bundeswehr
presence would allow Germany to increase the number of
soldiers involved in the training of Afghan National Army
(ANA) by more than 1,000. While Westerwelle has portrayed
his skepticism about additional troops as principled, it
was also motivated by a desire to put zu Guttenberg "in his
place." While the size of the troop increase is settled,
the length of the new ISAF mandate remains open. The
government is hoping to have the new mandate approved by
the Bundestag before the end of February, with significant
(if not majority) support from the opposition SPD and
Greens. END SUMMARY.
WESTERWELLE: BIGGEST OBSTACLE
¶2. (C) In explaining the lower-than-expected planned
increase in the number of German troops for Afghanistan, zu
Guttenberg told the Ambassador that Westerwelle's opening
position in the coalition negotiations on the new mandate
had been "not one additional soldier." In that context, it
had been difficult to get agreement on any increase at
all. (Comment: Zu Guttenberg proposed 1,500 additional
troops at the initial January 4 mini-cabinet meeting on
this issue. End Comment.)
DOING A LOT MORE WITH A LITTLE MORE
¶3. (C) To help justify the need for more troops, zu
Guttenberg said he had forced the Bundeswehr to do a
complete review of all the existing positions in
Afghanistan, which had confirmed that some could be
eliminated in light of the new ISAF counterinsurgency
strategy. He said a restructuring of the current
Bundeswehr presence, combined with the troop increase,
would boost the number of soldiers involved in the training
of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 280 to 1,400. The
restructuring includes turning the battalion-size quick
reaction force based in Mazar into a "protection and
training" battalion. A second such battalion will be
created in Kunduz by augmenting the existing infantry
company there with new troops. Zu Guttenberg reiterated
that Germany strongly supports COMISAF's focus on
protection of the population and partnering with the Afghan
national security forces (ANSF), and that the German
"trainers" (i.e., the two new maneuver battalions) will
operate in the field with the ANSF.
PUTTING ZU GUTTENBERG IN HIS PLACE
¶4. (C) While zu Guttenberg said he is avoiding public
comment on whether the outcome of the coalition talks on
the new mandate is a "victory" for him or Westerwelle, FDP
Defense Policy Spokesman Elke Hoff told poloff separately
that Westerwelle's hard line against additional troops had
been motivated in part to "teach zu Guttenberg a lesson."
She claimed that zu Guttenberg had been too presumptuous
last fall in making speeches in Canada and the U.S. about
how Germany would significantly increase its troop
contribution to ISAF. He might have been able to get
agreement on a higher ceiling had he engaged
parliamentarians first and showed "greater respect for the
political process."
OPEN QUESTION: LENGTH OF THE MANDATE
¶5. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that the cabinet would
formally agree on the proposed new ISAF mandate February 9
and that the first reading in the Bundestag would be
February 10. FM Westerwelle is scheduled to speak on
behalf of the government in introducing the proposed
mandate. The government is aiming to hold the final
Bundestag vote on the mandate -- following two weeks of
committee hearings -- on February 26. Zu Guttenberg was
BERLIN 00000157 002 OF 002
confident that a large number (if not a majority) of
opposition politicians from the SPD and Greens would vote
in favor of the new mandate.
¶6. (C) A February 2 meeting of state secretaries
tentatively agreed that the new mandate should run, as is
the custom, for one year, expiring in February 2011. Zu
Guttenberg indicated, however, that it might be preferable to
stick to the length of the current mandate, which expires
in December 2010. He expressed concern that having the
mandate lap over into early 2011 could lead to a premature
debate on withdrawal, before the new strategy really had a
chance to work. (Comment: Another option under
consideration -- and favored by some in the Chancellery --
is a 18-month mandate, so that any debate on the future of
the troop presence would be put off until the fall of
¶2011. But the MFA objects that this would only raise the
ire of the opposition and give them an excuse to oppose the
mandate. End Comment.)
REASSURING THE GERMANS ON COMMAND OF THE NORTH
¶7. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that Germany very much
welcomed the planned inflow of U.S. forces into the north,
especially the helicopter assets, which filled a
long-standing shortfall. He noted, however, that many in
Germany question whether the U.S. will be willing to accept
continued German leadership of RC-North in view of the
increased U.S. presence. Ambassador Murphy assured him
that the U.S. had no issues working for the German command in
the North.
Murphy