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Viewing cable 10STATE8675, EXBS: DOE/INECP REPORTING CABLE FOR COMMODITY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10STATE8675 | 2010-01-28 14:02 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET//NOFORN | Secretary of State |
VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #8675 0281433
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 281427Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0000
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0000
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0000
S E C R E T STATE 008675
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EMBASSY MUSCAT FOR EXBS ADVISOR TYLER HOFFMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020
TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP PARM OTR TC
SUBJECT: EXBS: DOE/INECP REPORTING CABLE FOR COMMODITY
IDENTIFICATION TRAINING, DUBAI, 10-13 JAN 2010
Classified By: Jerry Guilbert for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (U) The Department of Energy,s (DOE) International
Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP), through
funding provided by the Department of State,s Export Control
and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program,
conducted Commodity Identification Training (CIT) for Dubai
Customs, Jan 10 ) 13, 2010. CIT teaches customs agents to
recognize WMD-related dual-use items, and this event marked
the first time INECP had delivered any type of training in
the Unite Arab Emirates (UAE).
¶2. (U) The INECP team consisted of Chris Walker (DOE HQ);
Heidi Mahy and Kevin Whattam (Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory); Basil Picologlou (Argonne National Laboratory);
and Kirk Walker (Kansas City Plant). Lisa Meyers (DOS/Office
of Counterproliferation Initiatives) and Tyler Hoffmann (EXBS
Advisor for the Middle East) also attended. The Dubai office
of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement provided
organizational support and attended the course.
¶3. (U) The course began with brief overviews of Weapons and
Mass Destruction and delivery systems (missiles), which
occupied most of the workshop,s first day. The remaining
three days consisted of about three dozen modules covering a
range of controlled goods, including machine tools,
gyroscopes, (precursor) chemicals, and many others. The
course also featured several practical exercises and
&games8 to test the participants, grasp of the material.
Unsurprisingly, the attendees were not particularly lively
during the overview presentations, but they showed strong
interest in the commodity presentations and especially the
exercises. Dubai Customs brought an x-ray van to the course,
allowing both instructors and participants to see how some
controlled goods (that is, the ones INECP brought along as
teaching aids) look when x-rayed, probably the part of the
course that generated the most interest and excitement. This
was the first time any Customs agency had provided an X-ray
van at a CIT seminar.
¶4. (U) Attendance on the part of Dubai Customs varied from
about 15 participants on the first day to around 20 or so for
most of Days 2 through 4, plus a few individuals from the
training division responsible for organizing the event. Most
of the attendees work in Port Rashid, but there were also
attendees from the Jebel Ali, Cargo Village, UAE-Oman border
crossing, and two representatives from Dubai Customs, WMD
division. Mr. Mohammed Foolad, the Dubai Custom,s Manager
for Non-proliferation of WMD, was the senior-most person in
attendance and had a good working knowledge about WMD related
dual-use items from his work. He leads a special unit of
five individuals (one of whom attended the course with him).
He requested extra copies of the printed course materials
and electronic versions of all the Arab-language materials,
which the team provided to him.
¶5. (U) Overall, the level of interest was quite good. The
audience was fairly participatory, and showed a great deal of
energy in particular while x-raying the goods and during a
wrap-up exercise, in which groups of participants identify
pictures of goods from the course. Multiple participants
stated that cooperation should continue in the future; time
will tell if the sentiment was genuine.
¶6. (S) In a side conversation between Mr. Foolad and Ms.
Meyers, he noted that his job is to coordinate WMD- related
cases. He works closely with the Dubai General Directorate
of State Security on sensitive issues. When asked about the
Export Control office, he noted that he works with them, but
that they are new to this issue, while Dubai Customs has been
working on this issue for years. He noted that the UAE was
developing a computer system that will allow Emirate- level
customs offices to communicate with each other.
¶7. (S//NF) CONTD: On targeting, Mr. Foolad noted that Dubai
Customs is stopping WMD related cargo on their own (without
information from foreign governments) using their targeting
methods. They currently use the control lists of the various
regimes to target controlled goods, as well as information
provided by the United States, Germany, and others to target
end users. They have a handbook created by Dubai Customs to
help their officers physically identify WMD related dual-use
goods, but noted they have had difficulty finding pictures of
certain Wassenaar military- related items. He described a
case of glass fiber stopped on its way from the Netherlands
to Iran, as well as some 7075 aluminum. He noted that they
really need more information on who the suspect end users
are, as they could use this information to help them better
target WMD end users. He mentioned that they routinely find
that the same phone numbers are associated with different
companies.
¶8. (S//NF) CONTD: Mr. Foolad explained the serious problems
they are facing at their Cargo Village facility, which is
where they handle air cargo shipments. He noted that they
have to look at over 9,000 shipments a month going to one
country of concern (i.e., Iran). He noted how difficult this
is due to the quick time frame, but how necessary given the
sensitivity. NOTE: Mr. Foolad seemed to take the course,
and moreover his responsibilities leading the WMD unit, very
seriously.
¶9. (U) Point of Contact for DOS/EXBS program activities in
UAE is Vennie Pikoulos-Psaros: ph ) 202-647-4513; email:
PikoulosBA8at8state.gov. Point of Contact for DOE/INECP
program activities in UAE is Chris Walker: ph - 202-586-0052;
email: chris.walker8at8nnsa.doe.gov.
CLINTON