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Viewing cable 10BAGHDAD112, SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL ON MOTTAKI VISIT AND IRAQ-IRAN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10BAGHDAD112 | 2010-01-17 09:09 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad |
VZCZCXRO0554
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHGB #0112/01 0170925
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 170925Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6146
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0692
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000112
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO LIMBERT AND CORBIN; NEA/I AND NEA/IR.
NSC FOR TALWAR, MAGSAMEN, PHEE, AND VROOMAN.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR TU IZ
SUBJECT: SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL ON MOTTAKI VISIT AND IRAQ-IRAN
BORDER DISPUTE
REF: A. BAGHDAD 3326
¶B. 09 BAGHDAD 2237
Classified By: Acting Political M/C Yuri Kim for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d )
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Taha Shukr Abbassi, the head of
the Iraqi MFA's Neighboring Countries' division (A/S
equivalent), made the following comments regarding Iranian FM
Mottaki's visit and the recent oil field dispute between Iraq
and Iran: (1) Mottaki promised to fully withdraw Iranian
soldiers from the disputed oil field (ref A) and pressed the
GOI to conduct joint surveys of the Iran-Iraq border; (2) the
Iranians have not yet withdrawn their soldiers; (3) GOI
technical survey teams will begin their work once Iranian
soldiers fully withdraw; (3) the incident has tarnished
Iran's standing among many Iraqi Shi'a supporters; (4) the
GOI does not recognize the 1975 Algiers Accord governing
border issues and would like to negotiate a new or amended
agreement with Iran; (5) Iran, unlike Turkey, is slow in
fulfilling its promises and implementing bilateral
agreements; and (6) Iraq recognizes the need to proceed
patiently and diplomatically in its dealing with Iran to
ensure a peaceful outcome to these and other disputes. END
SUMMARY.
Iranian Troops Still Present
----------------------------
¶2. (C) On January 13, Ambassador Taha Shukr Abbassi met with
Post's Deputy Political Counselor and Senior Iran Watcher to
discuss FM Mottaki's recent visit in light of the Fakka oil
field incident. Abbassi, a career diplomat who has had
extensive dealings with the Iranians, confirmed that FM
Mottaki pressed the GOI during his visit to resume the work
of a technical committee tasked with conducting joint surveys
along the Iran-Iraq border, including the maritime border.
FM Mottaki offered assurances of Iranian troop withdrawal
from the disputed oil field; however, the continued presence
of Iranian troops called into question Iran's willingness to
deliver on its promises, Abbassi complained. He added that
the Iranian incursion has undermined Iran's standing among
many Iraqi Shi'a supporters, who viewed the dispute as
nothing more than typical Iranian aggression and interference
in Iraqi affairs.
¶3. (C) Abbassi criticized Mottaki for failing to keep his
promise and said the work of the two GOI technical teams
(land and water) would only begin once all Iranian troops
have fully withdrawn from the disputed area. Abbassi
asserted that the work of the committees "will take years to
complete" given the complexity of the terrain and the
security risks posed by landmines that are scattered along
the border areas since the Iran-Iraq war. Senior MFA
Advisor Mohammed al-Haj Hamoud told DCM the same day that the
Iraqis had been ready to allow the working groups to start
their work, even with the less-than-complete Iranian border,
"We're only talking about a 100 meters or so and the border
area is admittedly undefined," but then the Iranians moved in
high-powered lights and a small piece of artillery.
Following that, FM Zebari had ordered the teams to stand down
at present, said Haj Hamoud, adding that an additional
"partial withdrawal, a gesture" might be enough to get the
work back on track. (NOTE: USG satellite imagery confirms
the continued presence of Iranian troops approximately 75-100
meters inside Iraq. Imagery has also captured what appears
to be Iranian construction activity, including the
Qto be Iranian construction activity, including the
establishment of a small building near the troop outpost.
END NOTE)
Iran Not As Reliable As Turkey
------------------------------
¶4. (C) Describing Iran's intransigence as usual Iranian
stubbornness and inefficiency when it comes to implementing
agreements, Abbassi said that over a year ago, he personally
presented Mottaki with a non-paper proposing a new way
forward on Iraq-Iran relations, focusing largely on bilateral
issues such as borders, maritime rights, natural resources,
etc. The paper was intended to wipe the slate clean for both
countries, who technically remain in a state of war following
the cessation of hostilities in 1988. "We have not heard back
regarding the paper," Abbassi lamented. "The Iranians still
feel that they are dealing with the same Iraq that Saddam
dominated for so long. But we are a very different country
now," Abbassi said in trying to explain lingering Iranian
suspicions about GOI intentions. In comparison, Abbassi
BAGHDAD 00000112 002 OF 002
applauded the efficiency of the Turkish government in its
dealings with Iraq, stating that "Turkey is very good at
following-up and keeping promises."
Algiers Accord Obsolete
-----------------------
¶5. (C) Abbassi commented that the GOI does not accept or
formally recognize the 1975 Algiers Accord that was signed
between then-Vice President Saddam Hussein and the Shah of
Iran. Abbassi noted that Saddam himself literally tore up
the agreement during the war with Iran and that no current or
future Iraqi parliament would ratify the agreement in its
present form. (NOTE: The agreement was ratified under Iraqi
President al-Bakr's government and subsequently registered
with the UN. END NOTE.) According to Abbassi, the GOI would
welcome a new or amended agreement that takes into account
existing political and geographic realities, notably with the
Shatt-al-Arab waterway since 1975. However, the Iranians are
reluctant to renegotiate because they fear losing territory
and waters claimed in the Shatt al-Arab, which a new
demarcation would likely not recognize, Abbassi said. (NOTE:
Despite repeated condemnation of the Algiers Accord by
numerous GOI officials, the GOI has never made use of any of
the dispute resolution mechanisms contained in the agreement,
nor made any attempt to legally terminate the agreement. END
NOTE.)
¶6. (C) Abbassi asked about what military support, if any,
the USG would be obliged or willing to provide to Iraq under
the Security Agreement in the event of future aggression by
any of its neighbors. He also encouraged greater USG public
statements condemning Iranian aggression as a violation of
international law in order to demonstrate to the Iraqi public
the USG's moral support for Iraq's territorial integrity.
Abbassi underscored that Iraq's relations with Iran will
require patience and diplomacy given historic grievances and
lingering suspicions.
COMMENT
-------
¶7. (C) Water and border disputes will continue to define
Iran and Iraq's broader bilateral agenda as Iraq regains its
political footing and maturity. Iran's reluctance (and
discomfort) in dealing with Iraq as an equal partner on
sensitive issues of broader public concern (water rights,
borders, trade) are likely to further erode GOI and Iraqi
public confidence in their closest neighbor's intentions and
"goodwill". Abbassi's comments highlight the challenges he
and other technocrats face in their dealings with Iran. It
is also increasingly apparent that both sides realize that
their bilateral dealings are driven less by a shared Shi'a
heritage and more by real-world priorities and diverging
interests.