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Viewing cable 09CARACAS728, VENEZUELA INCAPABLE OF SUBSTANTIVE NUCLEAR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CARACAS728 2009-06-11 17:05 2010-11-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Caracas
VZCZCXRO6727
PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHCV #0728/01 1621724
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111724Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3176
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY
RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000728 

SIPDIS 

HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
COMMERCE FOR 4332/MAC/WH/JLAO 
TREASURY FOR RJARPE 
NSC FOR RKING 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ETRD EINV ENRG TRGY EMIN PTER
PINR, ASEC, MOPS, PARM, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA INCAPABLE OF SUBSTANTIVE NUCLEAR 
COOPERATION WITH IRAN/RUSSIA 

REF: A. CARACAS 26 
B. LA PAZ 806 

Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuart for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 

1. (C) SUMMARY: A plain-spoken nuclear physicist told 
Econoff that those spreading rumors that Venezuela is helping 
third countries (i.e. Iran) develop atomic bombs "are full of 
(expletive)." He said Venezuela is currently unable to 
provide such assistance particularly as the Chavez 
administration "does not trust scientists." He added that 
Venezuela's nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia 
finalized May 4 is pure political theater as Venezuela is 
incapable of cooperation with Russia on the development, 
design, construction and operation of nuclear reactors. Also 
contrary to the agreement with the Russians, to the knowledge 
of the scientific community, there is no exploration or 
exploitation of uranium, ongoing or planned, in Venezuela. 
The scientist contended that, even if the Venezuelan 
government used all Cuban scientists, exploring for 
commercially viable uranium deposits in Venezuela would 
require a large taskforce and news of such an effort would 
leak quickly. END SUMMARY. 

------------------------------------------- 
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT POLITICAL THEATER 
------------------------------------------- 

2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Econoff 
June 3 that the agreement between Venezuela and Russia on 
nuclear cooperation has no real substance. The agreement, 
signed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 2008, 
but approved and formally issued by Venezuela's National 
Assembly May 4, lays out cooperation between the Venezuelan 
Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and Russia's Rosatom in the 
following areas: 1. Basic Nuclear Research; 2. Controlled 
Thermonuclear Synthesis; 3. Development, design, construction 
and operation of nuclear reactors; 4. Industrial production 
of inputs and components for nuclear reactors; 5. Exploration 
and exploitation of uranium and thorium; 6. Infrastructure 
development for nuclear energy; and 7. the development of a 
legal framework in the sector. 

3. (C) In a previous conversation with XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect throughout) on December 2, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the only part of the Russian agreement 
that had any potential might be the exploration and 
exploitation of thorium, as he believes Venezuela has 
significant deposits of that resource (Ref A). XXXXXXXXXXXX
emphasized that as to the rest of the agreement, meaningful 
cooperation is not possible. All Venezuela is currently 
capable of, he argued, is the purchase of finished materials 
and technology. 

--------------------------------------------- ----- 
URANIUM EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION NOT HAPPENING 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 

4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX bluntly discounted the idea of cooperation with 
the Russians on uranium exploration and exploitation, as well 
as rumors that Venezuela is providing Venezuelan uranium to 
assist other countries (i.e. Iran) with "atomic bombs." 
(Note: International press reports citing an Israeli Foreign 
Affairs Ministry document leaked May 25 alleged that Bolivia 
and Venezuela are supplying uranium to Iran. For a similar 
perspective from La Paz on the dubiousness of this claim, see 
Ref B.) XXXXXXXXXXXX added that former Venezuelan President of the 
Inter-American Commission on Atomic Energy Julio Cesar 
Pineda's May 8 statements to the press about Venezuela having 
more than 50,000 tons of uranium were "funny" and "not too 
clever." 

5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that in the states of Merida and Trujillo, 
there might be uranium deposits ranging between 60 parts per 
million (ppm) and 2,000 ppm, with 200 ppm being the minimum 
for an economically viable deposit. He contended that no one 
could be sure, however, since the last meaningful study 

CARACAS 00000728 002 OF 002 


concluded in 1976. He noted that his lab has conducted a 
"yellow cake" experiment with a few milligrams of Venezuelan 
uranium, but that it is impossible to extrapolate or even 
guess at the amount of uranium in Venezuela from such limited 
testing. 

6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that currently, as with all nuclear 
related materials, if Venezuela had a need for refined 
uranium, it would make much more economic sense to simply buy 
it rather than try to produce it itself. For political 
reasons, however, the government could decide to refine 
uranium anyway, XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested. He claimed that no 
Venezuelan scientists would be involved in such a decision as 
the Chavez administration "does not trust scientists." 
Nevertheless, he added, there is no indication of any 
interest on the part of the government to resume uranium 
exploration or exploitation. 

7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the last uranium exploration effort 
involved multiple labs and more than 30 scientists. Such a 
major undertaking would not be easy to hide for long, he 
said, even if the government avoided using Venezuelan 
scientists and opted instead for a 100 percent foreign team 
consisting primarily of Cuban members. Additionally, there 
are only three labs in Venezuela that could measure whether 
or not uranium concentrations are high enough to exploit. 
All three labs, including the one at USB, XXXXXXXXXXXX reluctantly 
admitted, either have broken equipment or no nitrogen. None 
of the three, he said, could currently participate in such a 
study. 

------- 
COMMENT 
------- 

8. (C) Although rumors that Venezuela is providing Iran with 
Venezuelan produced uranium may help burnish the government's 
revolutionary credentials, there seems to be little basis in 
reality to the claims. Similar to the conclusions drawn by 
La Paz in Ref B, it is highly unlikely that Venezuela is 
providing Venezuelan uranium to third countries. At one 
point, Venezuela may have been able to make good on Chavez's 
claims that it would purchase multi-billion dollar nuclear 
power plants from the Russians, but even that type of 
"nuclear cooperation" is doubtful due to the Venezuelan 
government's current financial difficulties. 

CAULFIELD