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Viewing cable 07ANKARA1258, TURKEY'S MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07ANKARA1258 | 2007-05-23 14:02 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET | Embassy Ankara |
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAK #1258 1431422
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231422Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2242
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA//
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
S E C R E T ANKARA 001258
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2022
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY
Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) The Turkish military's April 27 memorandum that
fueled the political crisis here was followed by a virtual
black-out with the military refusing to speak with either
domestic or foreign contacts. The silence was broken
recently when D/CHOD Saygun volunteered an explanation of the
military's motives and current thinking. We used the
exchange to reiterate the need for pragmatism and compromise
-- by all players -- in support of Turkish democracy and the
constitutional process.
¶2. (S) In a recent meeting with DCM, Saygun raised the
subject of Turkish domestic politics and said it was
important we understand why the military felt compelled to
make its April 27 statement. He said the military spoke out
solely to ensure the protection of Turkey's secular system.
This is the principle responsibility of the Turkish military,
which they are both obligated and determined to fulfill. He
asserted that Turkey's constitution empowered the military to
protect the secular state -- that was what they had done and
what they would continue to do.
¶3. (S) DCM responded by emphasizing the most precious
quality of contemporary Turkey is that it is both secular and
democratic -- and both must be preserved. She noted the
growing tensions and polarization throughout the country and
urged that the military exercise caution and pragmatism.
Avoiding confrontation and instability and ensuring that the
political process proceeds in a way that is fully consistent
with the constitution is in the best interest of Turkey and
of all Turks regardless of their partisan affiliation.
¶4. (S) Saygun said that the military did not want
confrontation and would not seek it out. He claimed they
easily could have sent tanks rolling in the streets if they
had wanted to, but they did not. He also argued that the
military was far more concerned with stability -- political,
economic, and social -- than the AKP which had made no effort
to compromise.
¶5. (S) DCM underscored the importance of having the
on-going parliamentary election proceed calmly and that all
accept the results of the popular vote. Saygun agreed
enthusiastically and claimed the TGS had "no problems" with
AKP in parliament or in government -- their only difficulty
was with radical policies that threaten stability.
¶6. (S) Comment: There is rampant speculation here about
TGS' next move in the on-going political drama. Overheated
rumors include efforts to shut down the AKP, discredit the
party leadership by releasing incriminating dossiers, and the
manufacture of crises. More prudent observers have suggested
that a tacit -- if still tense -- understanding has been
reached whereby the TGS has clarified its red lines on the
presidency and Islamist policies and the AKP has agreed not
to cross them. Rumors notwithstanding, it is clear that
maneuvering will intensify in the lead up to the July 22
elections, and USG support for democracy, compromise, and the
constitutional process will remain critical.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON