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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07PARIS743, CODEL TANNER: MEETING WITH FRENCH POLITICAL
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07PARIS743 | 2007-02-27 13:01 | 2010-11-29 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
VZCZCXRO8959
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #0743/01 0581314
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271314Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5193
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000743
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017
TAGS: PREL FR
SUBJECT: CODEL TANNER: MEETING WITH FRENCH POLITICAL
DIRECTOR ARAUD
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) During a meeting with Codel Tanner on February 22,
French MFA Political Director Gerard Araud reviewed the
current state of the bilateral relationship, commented on
NATO's continuing purpose, and compared France's and
Britain's historically distinct orientations towards the U.S.
He also discussed Afghanistan and Iran, two outstanding
cases of U.S.-French cooperation. On Afghanistan, Araud
highlighted France's continued participation in NATO
operations, but called for a more explicitly defined
"political strategy" for reaching a desired end-state. On
Iran, he emphasized the need for continuing pressure on Iran,
through P-5 unity, which is impacting on Ahmadinejad's
weakened position, and which offers the only hope for a
negotiated outcome. End Summary.
NATO's Purpose
---------------
¶2. (C) MFA Political Director Gerard Araud hosted Codel
Tanner, in Paris for the annual discussions of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly (NPA) Economic Committee with the
OECD, to a meeting and luncheon on February 22. Ambassadors
Stapleton and Morella also attended. Both sides saluted the
historical links and continuing cultural and economic ties
between the U.S. and France, along with our wide-ranging
diplomatic cooperation. Araud took the opportunity of the
visit of the U.S. members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
to offer, in his typically plain-spoken fashion, a thumb-nail
history of U.S.-French relations since World War II,
including our different approaches to NATO. Recalling an
Cold War bromide, Araud said that NATO's original purpose had
been "to keep the Germans down, the Russians out, and the
Americans in." Its current purpose is -- for the newer
central European and Baltic members, given their fear of
Russia, "rational or not" -- to keep the Americans in. For
other members, NATO provides a way to meet their defense --
without having to pay for it. Araud decried the abysmally
low defense spending by the European allies. Among the
Europeans, only the French and the British come close to
carrying their weight, an exception which can be explained by
their history as global powers, and their residual desire to
exert influence.
Trans-Atlantic Ties: The Cases of Britain, France and Germany
--------------------------------------------- -----------------
¶3. (C) Taking up this theme, Araud offered the Codel a
historical disquisition on the differences between France's
and Britain's post-war relationship with the U.S. Britain,
for its part, tries to "ride the tiger," influencing U.S.
policy behind the scenes. This is what they have tried to do
on Iraq: "With what success, we might ask?" France, on the
other hand, tries to defend its interests, "tries to exist
(as an independent player)." The U.S. often views this
simply as opposition, or anti-Americanism, which it isn't:
"We're trying to exist, and to exercise our right to have our
own opinion, including on how to address international
crises. That means that we may agree in some cases -- as on
Iran where we work extremely closely, coordinating daily. In
others, as in Iraq, we disagreed, and still do. This is not
anti-Americanism, it's France developing its own analyses and
exercising its own policy." Stepping back, Araud recalled
that the 1956 Suez Crisis had marked the end of both France
and the UK's great power aspirations. Each, however, drew a
different lesson from their joint failure. U.S. opposition
to the Suez operation, (which together with the Soviet
Union's threat to use nuclear weapons had scuttled the
Anglo-French operation), had led the British to conclude that
"nothing was possible without the Americans," and that their
influence would have to be applied through the U.S., by being
at its side, and having its voice heard as America's most
trusted ally. The French took a distinctly different course,
that of autonomy and independence (as symbolized in its
decision, a few months after Suez, to create its own nuclear
force). Germany was a case apart, for historical reasons.
With a military that was totally integrated into NATO, it was
America's model ally. Now things are changing: for the first
time since WW II, during the Iraq crisis, Germany opposed the
U.S. While the British and French conception of their own
roles -- "the special relationship" and
independence/autonomy, respectively -- still apply, Germany's
is now a question mark.
Afghanistan
-----------
PARIS 00000743 002 OF 003
¶4. (C) In the back and forth that followed Araud's
presentation, Ambassador Stapleton noted that we describe the
current state of the relationship as "normal," a
characterization which Araud's historical synopsis supported.
It's a relationship we value, said the Ambassador; and we
certainly do not take the French for granted. Rep John
Tanner (D-TN) agreed on the value of a diversity of opinion.
Reaffirming strong U.S. support for NATO, he pointed to
Afghanistan as the Alliance's defining issue. The U.S.
appreciates France's support in this crucial battle.
Congressman Paul Gillmor (R-OH), Vice-President of the NPA,
noted the importance of the NATO to the U.S, France's
commitment of resources to defense, and the commonality of
interests in our joint effort in Afghanistan. (NOTE:
Congressmen Tanner and Gillmor earlier met with French
television and print media to push for strengthened Allied
support in Afghanistan. END NOTE.) Araud agreed, citing the
recent dispatch of the French aircraft carrier Charles de
Gaulle to the region, which will allow France to increase its
participation in airstrikes in Afghanistan. However,
France's concern is lack of a "political strategy" concerning
Afghanistan, a point Chirac tried to make at the Riga Summit.
Perhaps France's proposed Contact Group wasn't the right
solution, said Araud, as it raises the question of
neighboring countries' roles, and Afghanistan's as well. But
at the end of the day, success in Afghanistan will be
political, "and we are simply not convinced we have a
political strategy, an end-game in view, a roadmap to
success. If what we are doing simply amounts to killing
Taliban every Spring, some of us, five years from now, will
have tired of this. That's our concern; we're not
criticizing NATO, which is doing it's job. It's the
political strategy that's missing. For example, Iran is a
natural ally in the fight against the Taliban. And there is
the drug problem, which affects you, us and Russia. We're
concerned about where we're going."
Iran
----
¶5. (C) Responding to Congressman Dennis Moore's (D-KS)
question about the French view of Iran, Araud underlined how
closely the U.S. and France have been working together over
the past four years. He distinguished Iran from North Korea,
"a criminal regime which doesn't care about the suffering of
its people." Iran, on the other hand, is a "sort of
democracy," a proud country, where public opinion counts for
something, and which doesn't want to be seen as a pariah
state. This complex reality calls for a dual policy: a
readiness to negotiate, but in a context of international
pressure. During the negotiation of UNSCR 1737 a difference
opened up between the U.S. and the EU-3, said Araud, with the
U.S. seeking a stronger text, while the Europeans insisted on
one that could be supported by the P-5. Araud contended that
now the U.S. agrees, retrospectively, that the Europeans were
right on insisting on a unanimous outcome, one that could not
be interpreted as the West ganging up on Iran. UNSC
unanimity (and especially China's vote) sent a powerful
message of Iran's isolation, impacting strongly on Iranian
public opinion. Araud admitted that "mercantile" factors
were driving some, especially the Russians. While the French
Treasury "is furious" about U.S. warnings to European banks
about their operations with Iran, said Araud, those efforts
work -- they're very effective. Araud commented that the
U.S. military option is taken very seriously in Iran. As
recounted to him by well-known French journalist Bernard
Guetta, who recently returned from Tehran, "the Iranians are
terrified; they take the U.S. military threat seriously --
people don't want it." Another important factor is
Ahmadinejad's growing weakness. "He was elected because he
wasn't corrupt, he promised housing and good administration,
but he hasn't delivered. And there was his recent defeat in
the municipal elections. That said, although the music has
changed, the words haven't": The Iranians continue to refuse
to suspend enrichment. Therefore we must keep up the
pressure. And the pressure is working. So now we must work
on a second sanctions resolution, and keep the door open to a
"double suspension" deal with Iran. We haven't failed,
emphasized Araud. According to Guetta, he said, many people
close to Supreme Leader Khamenei had "incredibly violent
things to say about Ahmadinejad whom they regard as an
upstart. They want him out. The subdued celebration of
Revolution Day, including Ahmadinejad's speech, in which he
did not mention the Holocaust, was significant. Araud also
pointed to a recent press interview with Velayati in which he
affirmed that the Holocaust was a historical reality. We
have two to three years, concluded Araud, to work on this
before Iran gets the bomb. We will and must continue to work
on this together -- including with the Russians and Chinese.
(6). (U) Codel Tanner did not have the opportunity to clear
this cable before departing Paris.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
PARIS 00000743 003 OF 003
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON